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I just had an argument with colleagues about the usefulness of Microsoft BitLocker drive encryption for keeping representatives of the state (FBI etc.) out of data. They were convinced that vendors of proprietary software have backdoors in their algorithms which can be used in severe cases, i.e. suspicion of terrorism etc.

The alternative is of course TrueCrypt, because in theory, the code is open and can be reviewed by the public. In practice, even though I know the programming language, I do not have enough knowledge of the algorithm to be able to spot a possible backdoor or a feature which might give an advantage to a deliberate cryptographic attack. Does anyone know if the code has been reviewed by a trustworthy 3rd party? And if so, how is their trustworthyness established?

So, to come to the general questions:

  1. How would a company which really, really wants to keep their files completely secret decide upon their cryptographic solution? They cannot be 100% sure that BitLocker is safe, can they? However, would they in practice be able to make sure that TrueCrypt is?

  2. How would you estimate the chance that Microsoft and similar companies work with government agencies and give them an advantage to breaking their security so that it doesn't take 1000s of years to break (is that how long BitLocker should take)?

Felix Dombek
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    "I know the programming language, I do not have enough knowledge of the algorithm to be able to spot a possible backdoor or a feature which might give an advantage to a deliberate cryptographic attack." Not a problem because there are probably hundreds of people around the world with that knowledge who are doing this for you. – Linker3000 Feb 15 '11 at 12:01
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    Have you heard of the "Underhanded C contest"? If there was a deliberate falsification in it, there is no guarantee that anyone would spot it. – Felix Dombek Feb 15 '11 at 12:10

5 Answers5

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Microsoft have pretty much stated that there is no backdoor in Bitlocker, and I don't think it is in their best interest to as the backlash would be huge.

The leak of the Microsoft COFFEE tools basically packages a lot of methods already known to the security industry in an easy to use product for law enforcement, but no where is a hack/backdoor for Bitlocker.

I am not saying it doesn't exist, but I find it highly unlikely.

There is nothing stopping you for using a Bitlocker drive and then having a Truecrypt encrypted file inside it!

I think the most likely way encryption like this will be broken is through pure brute force through super computer power.

William Hilsum
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  • This is the correct answer. If Microsoft stated that there is no backdoor, how should there be one? Impossible. – Jonas Stein Feb 27 '19 at 17:35
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To answer your first question, the company could:

  • Create their own encryption system (very difficult)
  • Hire a consultant or trusted/legally liable 3rd party to review publicly available code
  • Sign up for Microsoft's SharedSource program and review Microsoft's code
  • Use multiple layers of encryption (e.g. Bitlocker and Truecrypt together)

I leave answering the second question to someone more knowledgeable about BitLocker.

LawrenceC
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I find it highly unlikely that there is a backdoor to Bitlocker. Considering how much scrutiny Microsoft is always under, there are plenty of great programmers out there that are capable to sniffing out Microsoft's attempts at a backdoor. On top of that there are plenty of high profile clients that would leave Microsoft.

It just sounds like an overall bad business plan.

surfasb
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    Microsoft is also a US corporation with a lot of government contracts - it would find it very difficult to turn down a request for special access. – Martin Beckett Feb 15 '11 at 23:30
  • Your answer assumes that "high profile clients" buy good products. Is this always true? – Jonas Stein Feb 27 '19 at 17:39
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1) If someone wants cryptography, he does not look for an closed source tool with unknown code. What is the reason to a trust company selling you a program without code?

2) You should not blame Microsoft for it. You can simplify the question: If the company x is forced by law, or by the secret service to implement backdoors, will it implement them, or not?

You may be interested in the literature by Bruce Schneier on this topic for further reading. Yes, there were audits on Truecrypt. However trusted software does not help a lot, if you can not trust your hardware.

Jonas Stein
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Here are some general obstacles to encryption.

  1. Bad programming leads to buffer overflow, code injection, and etc
  2. Hardware bugs like Spectre allow security keys to be leaked
  3. Weak passwords
  4. User or user error

This just in 2-28-19 ThunderClap a thunderbolt exploit that allow direct access to memory. Another way to get your in memory encryption key discovered.

How would a company which really, really wants to keep their files completely secret decide upon their cryptographic solution? They cannot be 100% sure that BitLocker is safe, can they? However, would they in practice be able to make sure that TrueCrypt is?

TrueCrypt isn't safe VeraCrypt is a clone of TrueCrypt that is being fixed and maintained. Google "veracrypt audit"

Double, Triple, or etc levels of encryption.

Making sure every aspect of your PC is up-to-date. BIOS,Intel ME, firmware, operating system, all software on said OS, and etc.

https://ostif.org/the-veracrypt-audit-results/

StackExchange has a security topic/group/etc where users can expound on the finer details.

For companies with "Active Directory" the bitlocker recovery key can be stored in the AD. Then any IT person with access could use said recovery key to decrypt any device encrypted on our network. This is a feature that has been turned on by our company because the user is the weakest link! Many people forget the password and need IT to provide the recovery key.

bitlocker key

cybernard
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  • The only way to protect against “read the keys in memory“ attacks is to have the equivalent of Intel SGX,, essentially a HW enforced enclave, assuming the SGX bugs are fixed, where the key manipulation is done - ie SGX memory only place where unencrypted keys live. For software encryption, this might mean the entire encryption is done inside the secure enclave. Or it might mean that the secure enclave programs a HW encryption engine. And to make that secure against “logic analyzer“ attacks, one must armor/encrypt the data on the wires between the CPU and the encryption. Engine. – Krazy Glew Nov 14 '21 at 14:47
  • I would be surprised if veracrypt uses SGX or the equivalent. Actually, I would be surprised if there a group uses any hardware encryption engine or secure enclave. I do not know if bit locker uses any such, but I would hope it does, I would expect that intel would’ve provided manpower to Microsoft to get it done. Ditto AMD – Krazy Glew Nov 14 '21 at 14:51
  • Some will ask “what about Apple style secure enclave on a separate processor?“ Sure, those are fine, as long as they have dedicated isolated memory inside there chip or encrypted outside. And as long as there are not too many features put into that secure enclave. IMHO even accessing the file system is too much. If such a Secure Enclave provides Secure Enclave multiple unrelated services, they must be given dedicated isolated processors or the equivalent of an SGX mode. – Krazy Glew Nov 14 '21 at 14:57